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2.1 Introduction  
The accumulation of capital is often referred to the amassment of objects of value, the increase in 
wealth or the creation of wealth. Conventional wisdom posits capital formation as pre-requisites 
for economic growth and development.
1
 The present study concentrates on the impacts of foreign 
capital formation (or FDI) on a host country‟s domestic investment and growth, outcomes. In this 
vein, existing literature proposes several channels between FDI and economic growth. These are 
shown in figure 2.1.  
Figure 2.1: Channels from FDI to economic growth 
 
Source: Author 
The above figure depicts the FDI-growth nexus. The nature of the relationship is decomposed 
into three main impacts, namely: (1) the direct impact; (2) the indirect impact; and (3) the 
reverse impact.  The direct impact is shown by the arrow flowing directly from FDI to growth. 
In a production function, i.e. Q = f(L, K), this implies that FDI directly causes output through 
amassment of tangible assets (or increase in K). The direct impact of FDI is explained using the 
                                                             
1 For instance, non-financial and financial capital formation is usually needed for economic growth, since additional 
production usually requires additional investment to enlarge the scale of production. 
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neoclassical model in section 2.2.1. However, indentifying the direct impact only gives a partial 
understanding of the FDI-growth nexus. Thus, it is important to see beyond the direct impact of 
FDI. In section 2.2.2, the new growth theorists are reviewed to justify the importance of the 
indirect impact associated with FDI.   
Moreover, the indirect impact is shown in the figure by four arrows emanating from FDI to a 
“ring of spillovers”.
2
 The four arrows represent four main channels of FDI spillovers, namely: 
competition; linkages, skills, imitation. The “ring of spillovers” implies the total spillovers 
generated by FDI, which is assumed to depend on the absorption capacity.
3
 Note, absorption 
capacity is said to be determined by a cloud of conditional factors, which are discussed in section 
2.5.1. From the figure, the indirect impact is shown by the filled arrow moving from the “ring of 
spillovers” to domestic investment and, finally, to economic growth, this is explained in section 
2.2.3. Finally, the reverse impact is said to occur if instead economic growth leads to FDI. The 
existence of reverse impact has been shown by studies that have investigated causality between 
FDI and economic growth.
4
  
The chapter is organized as follows: 
Section 2.2: Gives an overview of the theoretical literature.  The literature is interpreted in terms 
of the direct and indirect impacts of FDI.  
Section 2.3: Deals with the empirical literature on FDI, domestic investment and growth. In 
addition, it justifies grounds for FDI spillovers and the role absorptive capacity in 
determining FDI spillovers 
Section 2.4: Provides an assessment of the literature on economic growth and/or domestic 
investment. This section paves the way forward of this study 
Section 2.5: Proposes a new theoretical model to explain the relationship between FDI, domestic 
investment and economic growth.  
Section 2.6: Summarises the main findings of the study, commenting on some implications. 
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 The term “ring of spillovers” is put forward in this study to imply strong positive correlation among the four 
channels of spillovers 
3 Where, absorptive capacity is defined as a measure that determines a country‟s ability to generate and/or absorb 
FDI spillovers. 
4 For example, Choe (2003), Chakraborty (2004), Gao (2005), Blomstrong et al. (1996), have shown that economic 
growth robustly causes FDI. 
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2.2 Theoretical Review 
2.2.1 The Direct Impact – A Neoclassical Model 
Early studies on economic growth commonly used the aggregate production function approach.
5
 
They attempted to describe the relationship between an economy‟s output and tangible primary 
inputs (or capital and labour). In particular, the seminal papers of Solow (1956, 1957) formed the 
basis for much of applied growth analysis within the neoclassical model. Notably, these studies 
integrated the aggregate production function using macroeconomic data. The role of investment 
in this framework can be summarized by the following two equations.  
The first equation depicts an aggregate production function showing the relationship between 
output (Y), capital input (K), labour input (L), and “Hicks-neutral” technology
6
 (A): 
Y = A*f(K,L)    [1] 
The second equation, commonly known as capital accumulation equation, explores the 
relationship between investment in tangible assets (I), and capital stock (K): 
∆Kt = It – α Kt-l    [2] 
Where ∆ represents a discrete change, α is depreciation, and It is the gross investment. It is worth 
noting, that the gross investment term can either be endogenously determined by profit 
maximizing firms or assumed to be some fixed proportion of output, say sYt.  Also, the 
neoclassical model assumes competitive factor markets and constant returns to scale where all 
inputs are paid their marginal products. Decomposition of the production function relates output 
growth as a weighted function of change in primary inputs (i.e. K and L) and multi factor or the 
famous cited as the “Solow residual” (or ∆lnA): 
∆lnY = βk ∆lnK + βL∆lnL + ∆lnA [3] 
Where βk is capital‟s share of output, is βL labour‟s share of output, and the neoclassical 
assumptions imply βk + βL = 1. The technology term, A, is assumed to be exogenous to the 
model and is described in equation [4]: 
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    [4] 
The appealing simplicity of this neoclassical framework has made it the backbone of applied and 
theoretical work on capital accumulation and economic growth. Equation [2] and [3] show the 
direct link between investment in tangible assets and economic growth. In particular, in this 
model capital accumulation contributes to economic growth in proportion to capital‟s share of 
national output. Despite its popularity, however, the neoclassical model leads to several troubling 
results. First, because capital accumulation is subject to diminishing returns, without exogenous 
technical progress steady growth in per capital income cannot be realised. This is a major flaw of 
the model since it does not explain technical progress at all.  Moreover, despite being totally 
unexplained, Solow (1957) attributed 90% of U.S per capita output growth to exogenous 
technical progress. Other limitations of the neoclassical model are associated with the definition 
of the term capital accumulation. The Solow‟s model considers investment to be purely in 
tangible assets. Recently, much more has been discussed on the definition of capital itself. For 
instance, Mankiw (1995) stated that “there is an increasing consensus that the role of capital in 
economic growth should be broadly interpreted” (p. 308). In addition, Jorgenson (1996) 
contended: “Investment is the commitment of current resources in the expectation of future 
returns and can take a multiplicity of forms…” (p. 57).  
2.2.2 Beyond the Direct Impact – The New Growth Theory 
A developing economy that succeeds in permanently increasing its saving 
(investment) rate will have a higher level of output than if it had not done so, and 
must therefore grow faster for a while. But it will not achieve a permanently 
higher rate of growth of output. More precisely: the permanent rate of growth of 
output per unit of labor input is independent of the saving (investment) rate and 
depends entirely on the rate of technological progress in the broadest sense. 
Robert M. Solow (1987)
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Although the contribution of Solow (1956, 1957) to the theory of economic growth has been 
rewarded with Noble Prize in 1987, the new growth theory devoted a lot of efforts in improving 
the Solow‟s model. The fact that the neoclassical model reported a sizeable impact of 
technological progress on economic growth, the challenge for the new school was to explore the 
determinants and impacts of technological progress. The new growth theory mainly focused on 
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Publishing Co., Singapore 
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the creation of technological knowledge and its transmission. In particular, it emphasized on 
incentives that drive innovation, invention, and creation as a main engine of growth.
8
  
Seminal studies of the new growth school comprised Arrow (1962), Shell (1966) and was 
reviewed by Romer (1986, 1990), Lucas (1988), Grossman and Helpman (1991). The models 
generally assumed constant returns to scale to inputs (i.e. capital and labour) and the level of 
technology was assumed to depend on a set of inputs. For instance, Arrow (1962) explained 
investment in tangible assets as generators of spillovers, i.e. technology is a direct function of 
capital. He used past gross investment to derive a learning-by-doing model. The can model can 
be written in simplified form as equation 5.
9
   
Yi = A(K)*f(Ki, Li)   [5] 
Where: i – represents firm-specific variables capital (Ki) and labour (Li),  
K – refers to the aggregate capital stock, and 
A(K) – is the technology function. 
In contrast, Romer (1986) specified technological progress, A(.), as a function of the stock of 
research and development. Romer (1986) assumed investment in knowledge to generate natural 
externalities. He stated: “The creation of new knowledge by one firm is assumed to have a 
positive external effect on the production possibilities of other firms because knowledge cannot 
be perfectly patented or kept secret” (p. 1003). Moreover, Lucas (1988) modeled A(.) as a 
function of the stock of human capital and stated that “I want to consider the external effect. 
Specifically, let the average level of skill or human capital…also contribute to productivity of all 
factors” (p. 18). Additionally, Coe and Helpman (1995) explained A(.) as dependent on the 
research and development stock of international trading partners. They stated that “when a 
country has free access to all inputs available in the world economy, its productivity depends on 
the world‟s R&D experience” (p. 862). Finally, Barro (1990) claimed that capital and 
government services are complementary inputs in order to generate constant returns to scale. He 
also pointed out that increasing capital alone is subject to diminishing returns.  
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 Adapted from Romer (1994) who simplified the evolution of the endogenous growth models. 
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The glass-ceiling between the neoclassical model and the new growth theory is the technology 
function. While the former assume technological progress to be exogenous, the latter explains 
technological progress as a form of investment spillover arising from different sources, for 
example: tangible capital, human capital, or research and development expenditures. More 
importantly, however, both the neoclassical and the new growth models defined capital 
accumulation (or formation, in the latter‟s case), as key ingredients to growth. Based on the 
arguments, it can be deduced that if FDI contributes to both growth (direct impact) and domestic 
investment (indirect impact), then its overall impact can be substantial. Thus, depending on the 
size and level of spillover it creates, FDI represents a potential source for sustainable growth and 
development. The next section devotes attention to explain the indirect impact of FDI. In other 
words, the existence of FDI spillovers, as depicted in figure 2.1, are scrutinized. 
2.2.3 The Indirect Impact or FDI Spillovers  
According to Lipsey (2002), the main reason to examine FDI spillovers from MNFs to 
indigenous firms is to understand the contribution of inward FDI to host country economic 
growth. Country level experiences suggest two types of FDI spillovers, namely: negative and 
positive. 
a. Negative Spillovers 
Early theories on FDI and spillovers on host economies were advocated by the dependency 
theorists. Basically, dependency scholars viewed FDI from the developed countries as harmful to 
the long-term economic growth of developing nations. Previous studies on FDI, such as Singer 
(1950) and Prebisch (1968) claimed that the target countries of FDI receive very few benefits, 
because most benefits are transferred to the multinational firm‟s (MNF) country. Bos et al. 
(1974) identified other factors that caused the negative effects of FDI on growth, such as: price 
distortions due to protectionism; market monopolization; and, natural resources depletion.  
Dependency scholars‟ contended that MNFs are “imperialist predators” that exploited 
developing countries and caused underdevelopment of the world economy periphery.
10
 More 
recently, UNCTAD (1999) supported this view and argued that MNFs had often been involved 
in the exploitation of natural resources and, therefore, FDI can be assumed to be of an extractive 
nature.  
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 Ghosh (2001) and Brewer (1990) survey influential studies of the dependency school. 
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However, empirical studies does not warrant the views expressed by the dependency school. 
Hein (1992), using data from 41 lower and upper middle income African, Central American, 
Latin American, East Asian, and Caribbean countries between the 1960s and 1970s, does not 
support the dependency theory. He showed that Latin American countries that pursued import 
substitution strategies and restricted entry of foreign investment in the 1970s showed poor 
economic performance. In contrast, East and Southeast Asian countries that encouraged foreign 
investment inflows witnessed rapid economic growth during the 1970s and 1980s. Moreover, 
Firebaugh (1998) found that LDCs with greater rates of foreign investment tend to exhibit faster 
rates of both long run and short-run economic growth. The contradicting results contributed to 
the critics of the dependency school and helped to shift attention from the negative effects of FDI 
to the potentials of FDI.  
b. Positive Spillovers 
Models on FDI and positive-spillovers emerged in 1970s. The seminal study by Hymer (1976) 
postulated international differences across firms at scientific and technological levels as a source 
of technology transfer and spillovers. By assuming FDI to represent the transfer of a “package” 
in which capital, management, and new technology are all combined, Hymer characterized FDI 
as an international extension of industrial organization theory. Caves (1971, 1974) and 
Kindleberger (1984) extended the industrial organization theory of FDI to emphasize on the 
behaviour of MNFs. According to them, MNFs face alien-territory disadvantages when going 
international.
11
 Therefore, a firm only undertakes production in an alien territory only when it 
enjoys some advantage over potential domestic competitors. Other theoretical works mainly 
include Koizumi and Kopecky (1977), Findlay (1978), Das (1987), and Wang and Blomstrom 
(1992). Koizumi and Kopecky (1977) pioneered a model to explain technology transfer from a 
parent firm to its subsidiary. In this case, technology transfer was assumed to be a positive 
function of the level of foreign capital stock in the host country.  
Similar to the convergence theory, Findlay (1978) explained that technology transfer tends to 
converged between developed and developing countries. His model assumed technology transfer 
to depend on two factors: first, the relative development gap between the home and the host 
                                                             




countries; and second, the share of FDI stock to domestic private capital stock. Das (1987) 
developed a model to address the transfer of technology from a parent firm to its subsidiary 
abroad using a price-leadership model from oligopoly theory. The core assumption in this model 
is that domestic firms‟ efficiency is an increasing function of the MNFs business activities, i.e. 
the larger the scale of MNF operation the greater the opportunity for domestic firms to learn. 
Wang and Blomstrom (1992) developed a model to explain technology transfer from a parent 
company to its foreign subsidiaries. Wang and Blomstrom (1992) showed that technology 
transfer is positively related to the efficiency of a indigenous firms‟ and the level operation risks 
in the host country (i.e. political instability, poor macroeconomic environment). However, they 
concluded that some technology transfer always takes place irrespective of the subsidiary‟s 
active learning effort. Finally, Walz (1997) incorporated FDI into an endogenous growth 
framework to show that production activities of MNFs in low-wage countries improve 
productive efficiency. In addition, FDI tends to encourage domestic R&D.  
According to Blomstrom and Kokko, (1998) spillovers occur when the entry or presence of MNF 
contributes to the productivity or efficiency benefits of indigenous firms. The literature identifies 
four main channels of technological spillovers from MNFs to indigenous firms, namely: (i) 
“learning by watching”; (ii) competition; (iii) labour mobility; and (iv) linkage.  
(i) Competition 
The second spillover channel occurs if the presence of MNFs increases competition locally. 
Suppose that the presence of MNFs increases domestic competition, then, to stay competitive, 
indigenous firms are forced to use existing resources more efficiently or to adopt new 
technologies. This ensures that indigenous firms operate more efficiently than in the absence of 
MNF (Kokko, 1994, 1996; Wang and Blomstrom, 1992; and Perez 1998). De Mello (1997, 
1999) argued that FDI tends to promote the use of more advance technologies by indigenous 
firms.  
Caveat 1 
However, the competition channel may also work in a reverse way. For instance, Ram and Zhang 
(2002) pointed out that FDI may negatively affect domestic firms, since domestic firms will 
struggle to compete with the powerful MNFs. This argument is indeed valid for developing 
countries where local firms may be weak in responding competitively to MNFs. In contrast, the 
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local firms in industrialized countries are in a better situation to reply more competitively. In 
practice, the impact of FDI on local competition and/or market structure depends on the size of 
the technology, gap and the entry and exit behaviour in the market.
12  
(ii) Linkages 
FDI-spillover arising from linkages may occur in two ways. First, MNF can have productivity 
spillover on indigenous firms in the same industry (horizontal spillovers). Second, MNF can 
have productivity spillover on indigenous firms in upstream and downstream industries, also 
known as vertical (or forward and backward), spillovers. These linkages effects have been 
discussed by Lall (1978) and Clare (1996). Borensztein et al. (1998) argued that FDI increases 
the range and quality of intermediate goods, which in turn increases productivity. Blomstrom and 
Kokko (1996) provide a survey of studies addressing “complementary activities” arising through 
backward linkages.  
Caveat 2 
There is much evidence of the existence of backward linkages and a suspicion about the 
significance of forward linkages. In addition, linkages between MNF and indigenous firms are 
very likely to be subject to time, the skill level of local entrepreneurs, supply and purchasing 
practices, and local content. 
(iii) Skills 
FDI also causes spillovers through the know-how and skills that it brings into the host country. 
By transferring knowledge, FDI increases the stock of knowledge in the host country through 
labour training, transfer of skills, and the transfer of managerial and organizational best practices.  
It can be argued that spillover effect occurs when workers and managers employed in foreign 
affiliates who have been trained with advanced technical and managerial skills move to other 
domestic firms or open their own enterprises (Fosfuri, 1996). Theoretical work has generally 
predicted positive effects of FDI presence on domestic firms‟ productivity through the labour 
mobility channel (Kaufmann, 1997; Haaker, 1999; Fosfuri, Motta, and Rønde, 2001; Glass and 
Saggi, 2002). 
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While it is agreed that MNFs firm generates positive spillovers via the labour mobility channel, it 
can be argued that instead of training local workers, MNFs may skim the market of well-trained 
workers and free-ride on previous training provided by domestic firms. 
(iv) Imitation or “Learning by Watching” 
The simplest example of spillover is conceivably the case where an indigenous firm improves its 
productivity by imitating the technology used by MNFs. The imitation effect is also known as 
demonstration effect or learning-by-watching effect (Gunther, 2002). According to Wang and 
Blomstrom (1992) as new technologies are introduced by MNFs, indigenous firms experience 
MNFs actions, skills or techniques and „imitate‟ or adopt these techniques resulting in higher 
productive efficiency. Jenkins (1990, p. 213) notes that “over time, where foreign and local firms 
are in competition with each other, producing similar products, on the same scale and for the 
same market, there is a tendency for local firms to adopt similar production techniques to those 
of the MNFs. Indeed this is part of a general survival strategy, whereby in order to compete 
successfully with the MNFs local capital attempts to imitate the behavior of the MNFs”. 
Blomstrom and Kokko (1996) provide a survey of previous studies investigating the 




It is important to note that the learning-by-watching effect depends crucially on factors such as 
the legal system (patents/license), regulations, infrastructure, human capital, and the complexity 
of the MNFs technology. 
2.3 Empirical Review 
2.3.1 FDI, Economic Growth & Domestic Investment  
On one hand, the influence of FDI on economic growth has been usually assessed through 
econometric model specifying the rate of growth of real GDP or GDP per capita as a function of 
the stock or inflow of FDI. On the other hand, the link between FDI and domestic investment 
been assessed through the crowding-in/crowding-out hypothesis. In both cases, evidence shows 
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mixed findings on the impacts of FDI on growth and domestic investment. Some important 
findings are discussed below. 
Borensztein et al. (1998) studied the effect of FDI on economic growth in a cross country 
regression framework; they utilized data on FDI flows from developed countries to 69 less 
developed countries for the two decades, the 1970s and 1980s. Their findings suggest that “FDI  
is an important vehicle for the transfer of technology, contributing relatively more to growth than 
domestic investment”. Blomström, Lipsey, and Zejan (1994) found that, among developing 
countries, from 1960 to 1985, ratios of FDI inflow to GDP in a five- year period were positively 
related to growth in the subsequent five- year period. They report that the positive impact of FDI 
on growth is larger in those countries that exhibit higher levels of per capita income. 
Borensztein, De Gregorio, and Lee (1995) found that FDI inflows marginally affected growth for 
a sample of 69 developing. Balasubramanyam, Salisu and Sapsford (1996) used a cross-country 
study procedure to analyse 46 LDCs, in 1970-85. Their results suggest that FDI enhances growth 
in those cases in which the host country has adopted trade liberalization policies. Zhang (2001) 
documents similar result. 
The panel data analysis of Bengoa et al. (2003) for a sample of 18 Latin American countries for 
1970-99 shows that FDI is positively correlated with economic growth in the host countries.  
Borensztein et al. (1995), using a panel data of 69 countries from 1970-1989, found that a 
minimum human capital threshold was necessary for FDI to have a positive impact on growth. 
They also found that FDI contributed more to growth than domestic investment. De Gregorio 
(1992) finds a positive and significant impact of FDI and growth in a panel of 12 Latin American 
countries over the period 1950-1985.  
Country-specific studies that have explore the link between FDI and economic growth includes 
Mattaya and Veeman (1996) on Malawi; Kabarsi et al. (2000) on Egypt; Ouattara (2005) on 
Senegal. De Mello (1999) adopted time series and panel data analysis on a sample of OECD and 
non-OECD countries for the period 1970-90. He claimed that FDI has a positive impact on 
growth whenever FDI and domestic investment are complements. Roy and Van den Berg (2006) 
apply a time series data to a simultaneous equation model (SEM) that explicitly captures the bi-
directional relationship between FDI and growth in the US. Their findings reveal that FDI plays 
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a significant, positive and economically important impact on growth. The SEM estimates also 
reveal that FDI growth is income inelastic. Their findings imply that even in the case of a 
technologically advanced country such as the U.S gains from FDI are very substantial in the long 
run. Other studies investigating the FDI-growth nexus, including Lipsey (2000), have mostly 
concluded that FDI promote growth. For instance, De Mello (1997), Oliva and Rivera-Batiz 
(2002), and Choe (2003) find significant relationship between FDI and Growth. However, as 
shown by De Mello (1999) and Nair-Reichert and Weinhold (2001), the direction of the causality 
is unclear.  Dees (1998) found that FDI played an important role in promoting economic growth 
in China.  
Chakraborty and Basu (2002), looking at the case study of India from 1974 to 1996 also found 
that FDI had a positive and significant impact on growth, both in the short and long run. Finally, 
Zhang (2001) looking at East-Asia and Latin America from the 1960s to 1997 found mixed 
evidence on the impact of FDI on growth. While FDI was found to be growth enhancing in the 
long run in Taiwan, Mexico, Hong Kong, Malaysia, and Indonesia, this was not the case in 
Columbia, Argentina, Brazil, Korea, Malaysia, Thailand and Singapore (however in Singapore 
FDI has a positive impact of growth in the short run). 
Extract from Melitz (2005), “Individual countries like China and the Republic of Korea have 
been successful at managing export-oriented FDI in ways that encourage the development of 
local content and industrial upgrading (UNCTAD, 2002). Conversely, countries like Costa Rica 
and Mexico, which have attracted export-oriented FDI effectively but have been less active in 
managing it, have not been able to create significant linkages with local firms” 
2.3.2 FDI Spillovers 
A central question in the empirical literature has constantly been whether FDI complements or 
replaces domestic investment. Development economists such as Rosenstein–Rodan (1961) and 
Chenery and Strout (1966), showed that a unit increase in foreign investment produces and equal 
increase in private investment. But, Rahman (1968), Griffin and Enos (1970) showed that if 
investment depends on income, then changes in foreign investment expenditure would cause 
greater changes in domestic investment, via the accelerator mechanism. Recent findings on the 
links between FDI and domestic investment includes: Fry (1992); Borensztein et al. (1998); 
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Bosworth and Collins (1999); Agosin and Mayer (2000); Lipsey (2000); Braunstein and Epstein 
(2004).  
Most macroeconomic and industry-level find positive correlations between FDI and productivity 
growth. According to Blomstrong and Kokko (1997), the evidence for spillovers seems to 
become stronger as MNFs source more of their inputs locally. However, the empirical evidence 
on FDI and its impact on host countries is ambiguous at both micro and macro level. For 
example, positive effects of FDI spillovers were reported as part of Caves (1974) pioneering 
work in Australia, and by Kokko (1994) in Mexico. However, Haddad and Harrison (1993) 
findings in Morrocco and Aitken and Harrison (1999) in Venezuela do not support the positive 
spillovers hypothesis. Hanson (2001) argues that the evidence that FDI generates positive 
spillovers for host countries is weak. 
Studies such as, Aitken et al. (1997), Aitken and Harrison (1999), and Saggi (2000) provide 
mixed evidence that FDI generates positive spillovers for local firms. Kokko et al. (1996) studied 
Uruguayan manufacturing plants to explore the existence of technology spillovers. They find a 
positive spillover effect only in the sub-sample of locally-owned plants with moderate 
technological gap vis-à-vis foreign firms. Other recent work at the microeconomic level, reported 
positive results for FDI and productivity spillovers (Lipsey and Sjoholm, 2005; Blalock and 
Gertler, 2005). Yudayeva et al. (2000), Castellani and Zanfei (2001), and Haskel et al. (2002) for 
example find positive evidence for the existence of spillover benefits from FDI. Conversely, 
Aitken and Harrison (1999) for Venezuelan firms and Djankov and Hoekman (2000) for Czech 
Republic firms report negative and insignificant spillovers, respectively. 
In a review of micro data on spillovers from MNF to indigenous firms, Lipsey (2002) revealed 
that there is evidence of positive effects. Lipsey (2002) stated: “Evidence on spillovers of 
superior foreign productivity to domestically- owned firms is mixed... However, the mixed story 
for spillovers, combined with the strong evidence for superior productivity in foreign-owned 




2.3.3 The Role of Absorptive Capacity 
The literature often points to the importance of absorptive capacity when determining a country‟s 
ability to benefit from FDI. In other words, it is argued that FDI generates “growth effects” only 
when the business environment/climate is suitable.  For instance, if the host economy is not 
endowed with adequate human capital, public infrastructure, financial institutions, legal 
environment and the likes, spillovers that may potentially arise from FDI are simply not realised. 
Blomstrong et al. (1992) argued that host country has to be able to absorb new technologies 
associated with FDI so as to benefit from the FDI. “The host country requires, however, adequate 
human capital, economic stability and liberalized markets to benefit from long-term capital 
flows” (Bengoa et al., 2003, p. 529). In fact, controlling for absorptive capacity has been very 
important in many empirical studies on the FDI-growth link (for example, Blonigen and Wang, 
2005; Borensztein et al., 1998; De Mello, 1999). In this section, we explore four main indicators 
of absorptive capacity.  
Human Capital Stock 
In a very influential paper, Borensztein et al. (1998) tested the effect of FDI on economic growth 
in a cross-country regression framework and suggested that FDI is a crucial tool in transferring 
technology, but the effectiveness of FDI depends on the stock of human capital in the host 
country.
14
 They reported that FDI positively contribute to growth only in countries where human 
capital is above a certain threshold. And, for the host countries with very low levels of human 
capital the direct effects of FDI on growth is negative. Balasupramanyam et al. (1999) looked at 
the same cross-section and found that the positive impact of FDI on growth was conditional on a 
certain threshold level of human capital endowments in the host country.  They also show that 
FDI is complementary to domestic investment. Recently, Li and Liu (2005) made a panel data 
analysis for 84 countries over the period 1970-99 and observed that the interaction of FDI with 
human capital exerted a strong positive effect on economic growth.
15
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The role of financial market is searched by Alfaro et al. (2002). They found, using various 
measures of financial development, that the existence and size of local financial markets is an 
important determinant of the extent to which FDI affects growth. This argument, which they 
trace back to Goldsmith (1969), is based on the assumption that in the absence or weakness of 
local financial markets, local firms are unable to take advantage of the various kinds of 
knowledge that they gain from the presence of foreign firms. Hermes and Lensink (2003) argue 
that the development of the financial system of the recipient country is an important precondition 
for FDI to have positive impact on growth. Durham (2004) examines institution and financial 
development as absorptive capacity that determines the degree of technology spillovers. Also, 
Alfaro et al. (2004) revealed similar results. 
Trade 
The efficiency of FDI in promoting growth can be increased by export promotion policy and 
decreased by import substitution policy. The study of the interaction between FDI and growth, 
given trade strategies, is commonly cited as the Bhagwati‟s hypothesis
16
. According to Bhagwati 
(1978), the growth effects of FDI could be favorable or unfavorable, depending on the incentives 
offered by host- country trade policies. Similarly, Balasubramanayam, Salisu, and Sapsford 
(1996) found that in 10 to 18 export promoting (developing) countries, higher inward FDI flows 
were associated with faster growth. Moreover, they argued that in export promoting countries, 
FDI rather than domestic investment drives growth. OECD (1998) supported that the beneficial 
impact of FDI is enhanced in an environment characterized by an open trade regime and 
macroeconomic stability.  
Public Infrastructure 
The effect of infrastructure investments on growth and development has received much attention 
since the work of Aschauer (1989).  According to Praufer and Tondl (2007), apart from 
contributing independently to growth, infrastructure is likely to be a conditional factor for FDI to 
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size, political attitudes towards FDI and stability, both the magnitude of FDI flows and their efficacy will be greater 




produce growth effects. A good infrastructure can be considered as a complement for FDI. If 
FDI meets a poor telecommunication infrastructure, poor transport, and unreliable electricity 
provision, it may not produce a high productivity impact. In contrast, public infrastructure, such 
as educational institutions, roads, port and airport, and R&D collaborations, can significantly 
support potential spillovers. In addition, other studies, i.e. Acemoglu et al. (2001), Hall and Jones 
(1999), Rodrik et al. (2002), found that the quality of institutions is an important prerequisite for 
growth. 
2.4 Assessment of the Literature  
2.4.1 Solving the Puzzle 
The previous sections have been devoted to explain the impacts of FDI on economic growth, 
both theoretically and empirically. And, after a grasp of existing arguments it can be argued that 
FDI positively causes economic growth in two main ways that are, directly through capital 
accumulation and indirectly via spillovers on domestic investment. However, empirical studies 
have drawn two important concerns, namely: 
a. Reverse Impact   
For the FDI-Growth nexus, the literature does point to some reverse impact from growth to FDI 
(as depicted in figure 2.1). For instance, if factors that promote economic growth also promote 
FDI, then a strong positive correlation between the two could imply that economic growth causes 
FDI. Some studies that have hypothesized the direction of the relationship between FDI and 
economic growth revealed that economic growth robustly causes FDI as well as domestic 
investment (i.e. Choe, 2003; Chakraborty, 2004; Gao, 2005; and Blomstrong et al., 1996). In 
contrast, Blomstoerm, Lipsey and Zejan (1994) examining the empirical relationship between 
economic growth and FDI, found that there is a unidirectional relationship between FDI inflows 
and the growth of per capita GDP for all developed countries over the period 1960-1985. In the 
same vein, Dritsaki et al. (2004) found a unidirectional relationship between FDI and economic 
growth for Greece, with direction from FDI to growth.  
In addition, for FDI and domestic investment, the reverse impact may also exist. For instance, if 
indigenous firms have more accurate information on local business opportunities than MNFs, 
17 
 
then domestic investment may act as a signal about the state of the economy to FDI or MNF.
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Thus, domestic investment may cause FDI. Studies, for example Mataya and Veeman (1996) 
highlighted that “aggregate level studies has mainly focused on the determinants of private 
investment, however, such studies, often did not addressed the causality between FDI and 
domestic investment”. The investigation of causality is indeed important as one can plausibly 
argue that domestic investment causes FDI. However, empirical findings have showed little 
support to this argument.  
b. Spillovers: Crowding-out v/s Crowding-in   
Many studies have focused on the spillover effects of FDI, as discussed earlier. Some have 
showed doubts regarding the spillover effects of FDI on domestic investment. For example, 
Rodrik (1999) stated: “today‟s policy literature is filled with extravagant claims about positive 
spillovers from FDI but the evidence is sobering.” Similarly, Haddad and Harrison (1993), 
Aitken and Harrison (1999), Djankov and Hoekman (2000), and Konings (2001), failed to find 
spillovers from FDI to domestic investment.
18
 According to Fry (1992) and Lipsey (2000) it is 
important to ensure to ensure that FDI does not crowd out domestic firms or negatively affect 
domestic investment. 
2.4.2 Unsolved Issues  
After carefully analyzing the literature it can be argued that empirical findings on FDI, domestic 
investment and growth are inconclusive. The results tend to vary across countries mainly because 
of differences in national policies, the response of domestic enterprises, the type of FDI, and the 
econometric methodology employed (De Mello, 1999; Agosin and Mayer, 2000). From the 
debate it can be deduced that FDI spillovers appear to be the goal behind the „global‟ pursuit of 
FDI, especially among developing countries. Over decades, many countries have adopted cut-
down tax policies and FDI promoting reforms with a view to realize the growth agenda, thus, 
justifying figure 2.1.  
Although the existing literature provides sufficient evidence on FDI as a generator of spillovers, 
it does not explain how the spillovers are absorbed by domestic firms. Few studies have argued 
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 This is particularly true in developing countries where market failure is predominant and information is 
incomplete or asymmetric. 
18 Haddad and Harrison (1993) studied Morocco, Aitken and Harrison (1999) studied Venezuela, Djankov and 
Hoekman (2000) studied Czech Republic, and Konings (2001) examined Poland and Bulgaria. 
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that absorptive capacity represent some conditional factors that determine the indirect impact of 
FDI. Different proxies have been used to measure absorptive capacity, including measures of 
human capital, financial development, physical infrastructure, openness, etc. However, no 
unanimous measurement of FDI absorption capacity is found in the existing literature. This 
shows that absorptive capacity may have been purely explained in terms of proxy variables that 
fit very well in complex econometric analysis. The question that remains is: What determines the 
national FDI absorption capacity level?  
This leaves room for improvements in the design of a reliable yardstick that may help to better 
measure the absorption of FDI spillovers. A better estimation of the ability of domestic firms to 
absorb new technologies associated with FDI may help to improve prediction on whether FDI 
positively or negatively affects domestic investment. Given FDI, a high (low) absorptive 
capacity ensures crowding-in (crowding-out) impact on domestic investment. This implies that 
absorptive capacity critically determine the overall impact of FDI on growth. From a policy 
perspective, developing a sound measure of FDI absorptive capacity may help to unfold the 
following question: 
 When does FDI promote industrial expansion and economic development? 
In the next section, a game theoretical framework is developed to simulate the direct and indirect 
impacts of FDI on growth, while controlling for absorptive capacity. The main motivation is to 
explain that the impact of FDI may be insignificant, or even negative, in countries where 
absorptive capacity is below a certain threshold. This study coins the term “absorptive capacity 
gap” to define deviation from a minimum threshold as explained in part 2.5.2.   
2.5 A Proposed Framework for FDI and Economic Growth 
2.5.1 Developing an Absorptive Capacity Gap Measure 
The absorptive capacity gap is defined as the proportionate deviation in absorptive capacity 
index from its median point. The absorptive capacity index mainly consists of four fundamental 
elements in a given country, namely: (1) the ability to invest (i.e. access to credit); (2) the ability 
to learn & create (i.e. education level); (3) the ability to move & communicate (i.e. public 
infrastructure); (4) the ability to trade (i.e. openness). The absorptive capacity index mainly 
reflects a country‟s ability to absorb FDI spillovers and is denoted as Z.  
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𝑍 =  
1
4
 𝐶𝑅𝐸𝐷𝐼𝑇 + 𝐸𝐷𝑈 + 𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑅𝐴 + 𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑁  
From the equation the absorptive capacity index represents the average of four indicators 
measured as: (1) CREDIT – domestic credit to GDP, which is a measure of financial 
development; (2) EDU – the education index is used to measure human capital (this is as per the 
UN declared measure); (3) INFRA – physical infrastructure, which is measured by public 
investment (expressed over GDP) in existing stock of public infrastructure, i.e. road and 
transport networks, telecommunication, ports and airports, etc; (4) OPEN – the openness 
measure, which is measured by export relative to GDP to capture export orientation. From the 
absorptive capacity index, the gap measure is derived as: 
𝜃 =   
𝑍−𝑍 
𝑍 
   
Where, 𝑍  is defined as the threshold median line; and 𝜃 denotes the absorptive capacity gap 
measure.  
The absorptive capacity gap measure gives the proportionate deviation in Z from the median, 
which is defined at 0.5.  In particular, the gap gives the difference between the actual absorptive 
capacity level and the threshold level to see if the gap is positive or negative. Note, that the gap 
is positive (or negative) when Z is higher (lower) than the median threshold. The relationship 
between the index and the gap is given in figure 2.2. 







The figure depicts two cases. Case 1: translating an absorptive capacity index of 0.75 into gap 
yields 0.5. Case 2: translating an absorptive capacity index of 0.25 into gap yields -0.5. Thus, for 
all values below the median the absorptive capacity gap is negative, vice-versa. Since the 
absorptive capacity gap measure lies in the range −1 ≤ 𝜃 ≤1, it amply caters for cases of perfect 
„crowding-out‟ and perfect „crowding-in‟. Case 1 and 2 are used in the next section to explain 
conjunction and disjunction sets, respectively.  
2.5.2 Translating to Compound Statements  
Figure 2.3 is used to explain the link between FDI and growth, it is a simpler form of figure 2.1. 
Figure 2.3 shows the direct impact through the arrow flowing FDI to growth. The indirect 
impact is shown by the arrow flowing from FDI to domestic investment, then to growth.  








To explain the figure some fundamental aspects on statements formulation are reviewed below. 
An inference is a list of statements divided into premises and conclusions. Statements of 
inferences are assertive if they can be assigned either of two truth values (true or false). An 
inference is valid if it has no counterexamples.
19
 Elementary or simple statements can be 
transformed into compound statements by applying the syntactical operations “and”, “or”, “not”, 
“if…then”.  
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The letters A, B, C,… are called statement letters and are used to denote elementary statements. 
Symbols are used to denote logical operators and are interpreted as follows: 
    - for “and” (conjunction) 
    - for “or” (disjunction) 
    - for “not” (negation) 
   - for “if…then” (implication) 
A statement or propositional statement is defined by two „rules of formation‟: 
1. Any statement letter is a statement.  
2. If A and B are statements, so are (A ⋀ B), (A  B), (A  B), ( A). Here A and B are 
called the conjuncts in the conjunction (A ⋀ B) and the disjuncts in the disjunction 
(A B). Also, A is called the antecedent and B the consequent in the implication (A B). 
Compound statements can be derived by combining statement letters with logical operators, for 
example, (A  B); {(A  B)  C}; {(A  B)  C}; {(A  B)  C}. The rules adopted for the 
formulation of compound statements are: 
 A  B is true if A and B are both true, and false if at least one of A and B is false. 
 A  B is true if at least one of A and B is true, and false if both A and B are false. 
 A is true if A is false, and false if A is true. 
 A  B is false when A is true and B is false, but true in all other cases.20 
The impact of FDI can now be explained in terms of the following statements: 
S1: A denotes FDI (Note: FDI is assumed to be exogenous). 
S2: B ( B) denotes rise (fall) in domestic investment. 





) represents positive (negative) absorptive capacity gap. 
                                                             
20 The idea is that the compound statement A  B is false only when the truth values of A and B constitute a 
counterexample to the validity of the inference from A to B, or when A is true and B is false. In all other cases, 
A B is declared true. 
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Now, the impact of FDI on growth can be summarized in terms of the following propositions. 
Proposition 1: Conjunction – FDI and domestic investment are complements when the 
absorptive capacity gap is positive. In other words, they are the conjuncts in the 
conjunction (A B) given 
+
, i.e. the crowding-in hypothesis holds. 
Proposition 2: Disjunction – FDI and domestic investment are substitutes if the absorptive 
capacity gap is negative. That is, they are in the disjunction (A  B) given 
-
. 
Then, the crowding-out hypothesis holds. 
Proposition 3: Implication 1 – if conjunction holds (proposition 1, refers) then FDI contributes 
to domestic investment, or the implication (A  B) applies.  
Proposition 4: Implication 2 – if disjunction applies (proposition 1, refers), then FDI replaces 
domestic investment, or (A B) occurs. 
Proposition 5: Implication 3 – if (A  B), then (B  C). In other words, if conjunction holds 
then higher domestic investment contributes to high growth.
21
  
Proposition 6: Implication 4 – if (A B), then ( B C). In other words, if disjunction 
holds, then lower domestic investment results to lower growth.  
Proposition 7: Deductions – The overall impact of FDI is assessed by summing the direct 
impact and the indirect impact. The direct impact is given by the straight forward 
implication (A  C). The indirect impact, however, is illustrated in terms of two 
scenarios. 
Scenario 1: Conjunction Scenario 1: Disjunction 
 
Given A  B 
 
Given A  B   
A  B 
B  C 
A  C 
A B 
B  C 
A  C 
Scenario 1 states: if (A B)  (B C), then (A C). That is, “if” FDI contributes 
to domestic investment “and” domestic investment contributes to growth, “then” 
                                                             
21 This proposition contends that domestic capital accumulation leads to higher growth, as discussed in the 
theoretical literature earlier. 
Crowding-in Crowding-out  
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FDI also contributes to growth. In this case, the direct impact and indirect impact 
are both positive, reinforcing the overall impact of FDI on growth. Scenario 2 
states: if (A B)  ( B C), then (A C). Or, “if” FDI replaces domestic 
investment “and” lower domestic investment brings to lower growth, “then” FDI 
indirectly leads to lower growth. In this case, the overall impact of FDI on 
growth depends on the net impact, or the difference between the direct impact 
and indirect impact. Thus, the net impact of FDI can be negative, positive, or 
neutral.  
Based on the above it can be argued that the impact of FDI critically depends on whether 
proposition 1 and 2 holds.  In the next section, a game theoretical model is developed to simulate 
the impact of FDI based on the conjunction/disjunction propositions.  
2.5.3 The game structure 
The illustration assumes a non-cooperative game structure in which players do not have the 
option of planning as a group (cooperation) in advance of choosing their actions.
22
 To simulate 
the impact of FDI, two players are assumed, namely: (1) multinational firms (MNF); and (2) 
domestic firms (DF). The absorptive capacity gap is assumed to control for conjunction and 
disjunction between the two players. The interactions between the two players are described in 
an extensive form to explain the strategies of the game.  
The Extensive Form 
Extensive form games are generally arranged in terms of sequence to explain players timing of 
actions or „positions‟.
23
 Nodes (or dots) are used to show positions. In figure 2.4, an open dot is 
used to depict the initial position of the game, represented by Nature (N). All the remaining 
nodes are filled-in. Each node gives a „position‟ of the game and is labeled with the player‟s 
taking the move.  In other words, each node gives the identity of the player who must choose an 
action if that position in the game is reached. Finally, arrows are used to show actions emanating 
from one node to another. 
                                                             
22 Kreps, David. 1990. “Game theory and economic modeling.” Oxford University press. 
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 Positions are defined a decision point for a player in choosing some action. 
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The game begins with the open dot in the centre of figure 2.4, labeled as N. Note two arrows 
emanate from N, one marked high and one low. Both high and low are determined by natural 
forces that are assumed exogenous. The high and low scenarios are assigned probability values  
and (1– ), respectively. Where,  is assumed to be 0.6. For example, when N is high, then the 
arrow moves to the solid node in the top-centre of the figure with a probability of 0.6. If, on the 
other hand, N is low, then the arrow moves to the solid node in the bottom-centre with a 
probability of 0.4.
24
 More importantly, N is assumed to capture the international business cycle. 
Figure 2.4: Non-cooperative game, an extensive form 
 
Source: Author 
Similarly, MNF, representing the size of FDI inflows, is assumed to be either high or low (Note: 
high and low are depicted in terms of left and right arrows, respectively). N may affect MNF 
investment behaviour in different ways, namely:    
 If N is high and MNF is high, then both are equal to $20. 
 If N is low and MNF is low, then both are equal to $10. 
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 In the present context, high (low) refers to high (low) FDI 
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 If N is high and MNF is low, then foreign firms are said to under-invest (or over-save) by 
$10. 
 If N is low and MNF is high, then foreign firms are said to over-invest (or dis-save) by $10. 
The above conditions are set in order to derive the payoff for MNF. Notably, when N and MNF 
are not same, then either under-investment or over-investment applies. In case of under-
investment, MNF save part of their investment yielding some interest. For over-investment, 
MNF dis-save in order to invest, thus, forgoing some interest. Note, the interest rate is assumed 
at 10% in both cases.    
To explain how the actions of MNF influence the second player, DF, Proposition 7 is recalled. 
For instance, DF may contract its activities (crowd-out or dis-invest); secondly, DF may expand 
its activities (crowd-in or invest). To explain „crowd-in‟ (conjunction) and „crowd-out‟ 
(disjunction) the absorptive capacity gap measure is used, the measure is already discussed in 
part 2.5.1. The gap assumes two values, positive and negative. In particular, positive gap  
enforces conjunction, whereas negative gap  validates disjunction. Since the absorptive 
capacity gap measure lies in the range 1, the present study assumes two gap values as 
shown in figure 2.2 earlier, namely,  and . Finally, the nodes labeled DF are 
joined by two dotted lines to show the information set enjoyed by the player. Here, DF has a 
complete information set, that is all positions are revealed to DF.  
Figure 2.4 is summarized in terms of three positions: 
Position 1 – N depicts some exogenous forces that determine the size of MNF activities (or FDI 
flows), which we call Nature (N), representing the international business cycle.  
Position 2 – The second position describes MNF, to imply FDI in a given country, as high or 
low. Note, since the determinants of FDI are not explored within the framework, 
some discretionary forces are assumed to decide whether it is high or low.  
Position 3 – The last position of the game is occupied by domestic firms, DF. It precisely 
captures the response of DF following MNF moves. Here, two actions are possible 
„crowd-in‟ and „crowd-out‟.  
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To explain the framework, assume that N is high; MNF is high; and DF alternatively satisfies 
„crowd-in‟ or „crowd-out‟. Given that N is high, the arrow points to the top-centre node showing 
MNF position. Then, from MNF the arrow alternatively moves to the top-left or top-right of the 
DF node.  
To obtain the payoffs, two restrictions are imposed: 
 First, a scalar factor is assumed to explain the impact of investment on growth. The scalar 
factor is similar to the investment multiplier and is equal to 1.
25
 Note, the same scalar 
value is assumed for both players. 
 Second, the rate return to MNF is assumed to equal the growth rate in output. Thus, 
return to FDI is computed by multiplying the growth rate and the initial amount of FDI. 
Note, initial output is assumed at $ 100.  
The payoffs, given in figure 2.4, show the outcomes of the game, and are computed as follows.
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On one hand, assume the top left quadrant, where N is high; MNF is high; and DF satisfies 
„crowd-in‟. Thus, if N is high, the probability 0.6 applies and MNF is high implies FDI of $20. 
Given conjunction (or „crowd-in‟), DF increases by $10 (i.e., $20 0.5). Then, total investment 
sums to $30, which increases domestic output to $130 (i.e., $100 + $30). The payoff to MNF is 
estimated at $6 (i.e $20×30%). The payoff for this path is given by (130, 6) in the figure.  On the 
other hand, if player DF‟s response is altered to „crowd-out‟, then DF decreases by $10 when 
MNF is $20, leading to lower domestic output of $110 (i.e., $120 - $10). MNF return is, thus, $2 
(i.e., 20 10%) given output of $110 and the payoff in terms of domestic output and MNF return 
is given by (110, 2).  
Now, imagine the bottom-left quadrant. In this case, N plays low, MNF plays high and „crowd-
in‟ holds for DF. As explained earlier, MNF will dis-save by $10 in order to invest $20 gap, 
which implies forgoing an interest of $1 (i.e. $10 10%). The loss in interest is taken into 
account when comparing the net return of MNF. The payoff for growth and MNF is, therefore, 
given by (130, 5). Note, the return to MNF is $5 due to the interest foregone. Additionally, when 
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investment. 
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For each set of payoff given in brackets, the payoff for DF precedes that of MNF. 
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„crowd-out‟ holds for DF, the payoff is (110, 1) due to interest foregone from over-investment. 
The remaining payoffs for the bottom and top right quadrants can be computed using same 
reasoning. 
The Strategic Form 
A strategic game is commonly defined as a situation in which players simultaneously interact. 
Generally, a strategic game is based on identifying: (1) the players (or decision-makers); (2) the 
strategies; and (2) the payoffs derived by players‟ for each possible outcome. An essential 
feature of this definition is that each player's payoff depends on the other players' actions. In the 
present case, two players are assumed MNF and DF and the strategies of each player are given 
below. 
Four possible strategies exist for MNF, namely: 
M1: if N chooses high, give high; if N chooses low, give high; 
M2: if N chooses high, give high; if N chooses low, give low; 
M3: if N chooses high, give low; if N chooses low, give high; 
M4: if N chooses high, give low; if N chooses low, give low. 
At the same time, DF has two choice situations representing two information sets, shown by the 
two dotted lines. In each situation, the player has two possible actions resulting in four possible 
strategies.   
D1: if MNF gives high, invest; if MNF gives low, invest; 
D2: if MNF gives high, invest; if MNF gives low, disinvest;
27
 
D3: if MNF gives high, disinvest; if D gives low, invest; 
D4: if D gives high, disinvest; if D gives low, disinvest. 
From the above, a strategic form game can be built to show each player‟s payoff pertaining to 
each strategy.  Note, MNF chooses its strategy from the list M1 to M4 and D from the list D1 to 
D4. The strategic form game is shown in table 2.1. The payoffs given in the table represent 
expected returns, to each player, as a result of each strategy. For each player, the expected 
returns are assessed using probability values assigned to nature (N). In addition, the expected 
payoffs depend on the size of FDI (high or low) and the responses in domestic investment (invest 
                                                             
27 The term disinvest is used to refer to reduction in capital investment. 
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or disinvest). Note that invest and disinvest refer to crowd-in and crowd-out (or conjunction and 
disjunction), respectively.  
Table 2.1: The game in strategic form 
  MNF Strategy 







 D1 130, 5.6 124, 4.2 121, 3.5 115, 2.1 
D2 130, 5.6 120, 3.8 115, 2.9 105, 1.1 
D3 110, 1.6 112, 1.8 113, 1.9 115, 2.1 
D4 110, 1.6 108, 1.4 107, 1.3 105, 1.1 
Suppose that MNF chooses strategy M1 and DF chooses D1.  Then, the expected payoff for the 
strategies is given by: 
    1301304.01306.0)( 1 DE ; 
    6.554.066.0)( 1 ME ; and  
   6.5,130, 11 MDE  
Since the first and second outcomes are respectively assigned probabilities of 0.6 and 0.4, the 
expected returns sum to $130 and $5.6. Note, the payoff (130, 5.6) corresponds to the cell (D1, 
M1) in table 2.1.  
The Dominance Strategy and Nash equilibrium 
In non-cooperative game theory two so-called solutions are often used, namely:  dominance 
arguments, and equilibrium analysis. Dominance is a method of eliminating weak strategies.
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The implicit assumption of the dominance argument is that both players will avoid a strategy that 
will give the worse payoff no matter what the other player does. Based on this, recursive 
dominance can be applied to eliminate one or more strategies for any one player and then one or 
more strategies can be eliminated for the other player.   
On one hand, it can be argued that MNF does not have a dominant strategy. This is mainly 
because the payoffs for MNF, thus, the strategies are influenced by the action of DF. For 
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 Weak strategies are strategies that yield relatively low payoffs. 
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instance, if DF chooses D1 it is more profitable for MNF to choose M1; and if DF chooses D3, 
then the best strategy for MNF is M4. On the other hand, the dominant strategy for player DF is 
clearly D1. In particular, D1 always and everywhere leads to, at least, higher payoff for DF than 
the other strategies. Therefore, DF will always prefer strategy D1, irrespective of the strategy 
chosen by MNF.   
The main limitation with the dominance argument is that it does not explain equilibrium between 
the two players. Due to this pitfall, the Nash equilibrium is explored to explain expected outcome 
of the game. In this case, each player assumes the other player to aim at maximising its own 
payoff. With reference to table 2.1, if MNF knows that DF will always choose strategy D1, then 
it will always play strategy M1.  Therefore, strategy (D1, M1) is the Nash equilibrium and neither 
of the two players will deviate from their respective strategies.  
As per the objective set in the present study, the Nash equilibrium confirms that the best outcome 
occurs when conjunction holds. Conversely, whenever disjunction holds, strategy D4 refers, the 
worst payoff is realised for both players.  
2.5.3 Implications for FDI and growth 
The game illustrated earlier can be summarised to represent the impact of FDI on growth. On 
one hand, M1 and M4 represent high and low FDI scenario, respectively. In addition, a moderate 
FDI scenario applies for strategies M2 and M3.
29
  Thus, the following is true: high FDI refers to 
M1; low FDI refers to M4; and moderate FDI refers to the average of M2 and M3. On the other 
hand, conjunction applies if strategy D1 is true; disjunction holds if D4 is true; and if either D2 or 
D3 holds then conjunction and disjunction may occur simultaneously. 
The growth outcomes pertaining to the level of FDI and complementarity between FDI and 
domestic investment are summarised in table 2.2. The findings reported above confirm the Nash 
equilibrium. In other words, economic growth is highest if both high FDI and conjunction holds. 
Conversely, the lowest growth outcome is realised if both low FDI and disjunction holds. 
Although the figures reported above may not at all represent growth rates experienced by 
countries, i.e. 30% economic growth rate, it helps in understanding the impact of FDI on 
                                                             




economic growth. In particular, it confirms that economic growth rates are highest when FDI 
leads to spillovers and industrial expansion in a host country. 
Table 2.2: Explaining Growth Scenarios 








Conjunction 30% 22.5% 15% 
Undetermined 
20% 15% 10% 
Disjunction 10% 7.5% 5% 
2.6 Conclusion and policy implications 
The straight forward finding of the 2-player game model is that FDI leads to higher economic 
performance if and only if conjunction holds. On the other hand, if disjunction applies then 
economic growth is always and everywhere lowest. Therefore, pure conjunction results to the 
first-best scenarios, a mix of conjunction and disjunction leads to the second-best scenarios, and 
pure disjunction reveals the third-best scenarios. Thus, for a country which emphasises on FDI in 
order to serve its domestic growth agenda, it is important to ensure that FDI does not crowd-out 
domestic firms or domestic investment. This paper appeals to public policy decisions on the need 
to improve human capital stock, public infrastructure, financial markets, and trade 
competitiveness (emphasizing on exports). The main contribution of the paper is in terms of the 
development of an absorption capacity index. It provides scope for future empirical research to 
test whether countries with higher absorption capacity achieve higher growth performance given 
some level of FDI. In other words, this may help to encourage policy decisions on FDI. Since 
many countries are competing for FDI using generous FDI incentives, it is important to assess 
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